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AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS: THE DIFFICULT 
BALANCE OF SOLVING CRIME AND PROTECTING 
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 
LAUREN FASH∗ 
In 1998, a District of Columbia police lieutenant pleaded guilty “to ex-
torting money from customers of a gay bar.”1  The officer wrote down the 
license plate numbers of the customers and intimidated them into paying 
him money by threatening “to expose their lifestyle.”2  Recent develop-
ments in technology have automated the process of license plate checking, 
which has only exacerbated the potential for these types of privacy abuses.3  
Automated license plate readers (“ALPRs”) are useful tools for police of-
ficers, as they have automated the process of police officers manually scan-
ning license plates and comparing them to police databases.4  License plate 
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 1.  Josh Hicks, A Few Reasons the Public Might Care About License-Plate Tracking, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2014/02/19/a-few-
reasons-the-public-might-care-about-license-plate-tracking/?utm_term=.ddb15120fc5c. 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id.; see also Kaveh Waddell, How License-Plate Readers Have Helped Police and Lend-
ers Target the Poor, ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/how-license-plate-readers-have-helped-
police-and-lenders-target-the-poor/479436/ (noting that the Electronic Frontier Foundation dis-
covered that the Oakland Police Department “deployed [license plate readers] disproportionately 
often in low-income areas and in neighborhoods with high concentrations of African-American 
and Latino residents”).  
 4.  KEITH GIERLACK ET AL., RAND CORP., LICENSE PLATE READERS FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 9 (2014), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR467.html; see also DAVID J. ROBERTS & 
MEGHANN CASANOVA, INT’L ASS’N CHIEFS OF POLICE, AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE 
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS: POLICY AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 9 
(2012) (finding that ALPR systems have the capabilities to “capture up to 1,800 plates per minute 
at speeds up to 120–160 miles per hour”); POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, HOW ARE 
INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMING POLICING?, 30 (2012), 
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/how%20are%20innovations%20i
n%20technology%20transforming%20policing%202012.pdf (finding that a recent survey discov-
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reader data provides numerous benefits but also has a high potential for 
abuse.5  ALPRs are composed of a hardware aspect and a software aspect.6  
The hardware aspect of the device “uses high-speed video cameras” to pho-
tograph every passing vehicle, while the software aspect reads and stores 
the “plate number, . . . date, time and location” of the vehicle.7 
ALPR devices originated in the United Kingdom as the country sought 
a way to thwart attacks by the Irish Republican Army (“IRA”).8  Initially, 
London relied on closed-circuit television to protect the city from the IRA 
terrorist bombings.9  The city also installed license plate readers at city en-
trances to help combat terrorist attacks from the IRA because the IRA rou-
tinely used car bombs in the 1990s.10  Eventually, the United Kingdom de-
veloped “Project Laser,” a multi-phased effort to equip officers with the 
resources necessary to identify vehicles and drivers that were “connected 
with crime, terrorism, and motor vehicle violations.”11  The program was 
deemed successful as over 46,000 arrests were made because of license 
plate recognition hits.12 
In 1998, the technology made its way to North America, with the 
United States Border Patrol being the first to use the technology in the 
States.13  The ALPR technology has enhanced the efficiency of the Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement Agency—especially as ALPRs are in use 
at near 100 locations as a way to identify and track vehicles entering the 
United States.14  ALPRs have been praised as being effective in “helping to 
                                                          
ered officers made “15 total arrests as a result of LPRs, compared to seven arrests resulting from 
officers doing the manual checks”).  
 5.  Hicks, supra note 1 (quoting Jack Bernstein, CEO of Locator Technologies, a company 
involved in ALPR technologies).   
 6.  Shaun B. Spencer, Data Aggregation and the Fourth Amendment, J. INTERNET L. 13, 15 
(2015). 
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Mary Beth Sheridan, License Plate Readers to Be Used in D.C. Area, WASH. POST (Aug. 
17, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/16/AR2008081602218.html. 
 9.  GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 7.  
 10.  Id; see also Tyson E. Hubbard, Automatic License Plate Recognition: An Exciting New 
Tool with Potentially Scary Consequences, SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 2 (2008), 
http://jost.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/automatic-license-plate-recognition_an-exciting-new-law-
enforcement-tool-with-potentially-scary-consequences.pdf. 
 11.  ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 4, at 6.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.   GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 7.  
 14.  David Silverberg, Automated License Plate Readers on the U.S. Border, GOVTECH 
WORKS (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.govtechworks.com/automated-license-plate-readers-on-the-
u-s-border/.  
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combat the flow of drugs, illegal currency and weapons across the U.S.-
Mexico border.”15 
License plate readers’ use has increased in number, and the majority of 
police departments in the United States use these devices.16  The ALPR de-
vices are an effective way for officers to identify vehicles that are stolen, 
unregistered, or belong “to sex offenders, crime suspects, fugitives, or am-
ber alert subjects.”17  Because these devices can scan millions of license 
plates, however, privacy concerns are raised in the data collection and re-
tention of the captured license plate data.18  Further, searches based on 
ALPR alerts also raise constitutional concerns.19  Additionally, few states 
have passed regulations governing the use of ALPR devices or policies for 
how the data is to be managed or stored.20  Although useful, ALPR devices 
pose a grave threat to constitutional protections—such as the First and 
Fourth Amendments—if safeguards are not implemented to balance the 
needs of law enforcement with the right to individual privacy.21  This 
Comment will argue that current Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence 
is ineffective at regulating the complexities of automated license plate read-
ers, and that Congress needs to act to ensure privacy rights are protected, 
while also ensuring law enforcement interests are protected.22  Part I will 
trace the history of privacy jurisprudence and highlight recent judicial chal-
lenges to ALPR devices.  Part II will present elements that are fundamental 
in any piece of proposed legislation to regulate ALPR devices and explore 
why Congress is better suited than the individual states or the judiciary to 
address the concerns raised by ALPR devices. 
                                                          
 15.  Jordan Steffen, License Plate Readers Help Police and Border Patrol, but Worry Privacy 
Advocates, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/26/nation/la-na-
license-reader-20101226. 
 16.  See Waddell, supra note 3 (noting that “a survey of police agencies conducted in 2011 
showed that 71 percent of departments used license-plate readers, and that 85 percent of depart-
ments planned to increase their use over the next five years”).  
 17.  Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Use of License Plate Readers, 32 A.L.R. Fed. 7th Art. 
8 (2017).   
 18.  Steffen, supra note 15.  The data set of one company, Vigilant Solutions, “contained 
more than 3 billion scans, and was growing at a rate of more than 100 million scans a month” as 
of 2015.  Waddell, supra note 3.  Vigilant Solutions shares their datasets with law enforcement 
officers.  Id. 
 19.  Randy L. Dryer & S. Shane Stroud, Automatic License Plate Readers: An Effective Law 
Enforcement Tool or Big Brother’s Latest Instrument of Mass Surveillance? Some Suggestions for 
Legislative Action, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 225, 236–38 (2015); Winbush, supra note 17, at 8.   
 20.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 227–28.  
 21.  See infra Section II.C.  
 22.  See infra Sections II.A–B. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
The data collected and stored by ALPR systems and the stops that are 
conducted based on ALPR data implicate Fourth Amendment protections.23  
Understanding these implications requires an understanding of how the 
Fourth Amendment’s privacy jurisprudence fits into a world with ever-
evolving technology.24  Additionally, some states have implemented legis-
lation that limits the use of ALPR devices in an effort to protect citizen pri-
vacy rights while still allowing police officers to fulfill their law enforce-
ment duties.25  Section I.A provides an overview of current privacy 
jurisprudence to demonstrate how ALPRs fit into the current and rapidly 
changing scheme of technology and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Section I.B explores current regulations and legislation being implemented 
across the nation at the state level and highlights how different states inter-
pret data privacy and the storage of license plate data.  Section I.C discusses 
instances where an alert is sufficient for reasonable suspicion but also re-
views the potential for error in ALPR alerts.  Section I.D analyzes the pri-
vacy implications of stored license plate data and whether the stored data is 
protected from public release and, if so, the limitations of such protection. 
A.  An Overview of Current Fourth Amendment Privacy Jurisprudence 
In analyzing Fourth Amendment cases, it is necessary to understand 
the boundaries of privacy protections.26  In Katz v. United States,27 the de-
fendant made a call from inside a telephone booth where the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (“FBI”) had attached a listening device to the outside of the 
booth.28  In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan developed a two-part rea-
sonableness inquiry to determine if the defendant had a “constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy” within the telephone booth.29  
The first part of the test looks to see if an individual has “an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy” and the second part focuses on if that expecta-
tion is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”30  Justice 
Harlan explained that even though the defendant was conducting his con-
versation in public view, he shut the telephone booth door “and pa[id] the 
                                                          
 23.  The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. CONT. amend. VI.  
 24.  See infra Section I.A.  
 25.  See infra Section I.B.   
 26.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 27.  389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 28.  Id. at 348.   
 29.  Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 30.   Id. at 361.  This test was later adopted by the Court in Smith v. Maryland.  442 U.S. 735 
(1979). 
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toll that permit[ted] him to place a call” thus the defendant could have rea-
sonably expected his telephone conversation to have remained private.31 
In Kyllo v. United States,32 the Court considered whether law enforce-
ment’s use of a “thermal-imaging device . . . to detect relative amounts of 
heat within the home” was a search that violated the Fourth Amendment.33  
This device afforded law enforcement the opportunity “to detect infrared 
radiation,” which is emitted by almost every object, but is invisible “to the 
naked eye.”34  A United States Department of Interior agent suspected the 
petitioner, Kyllo, was growing marijuana inside his home, so officers used 
the device to take two scans of Kyllo’s home.35  The scan revealed that 
some parts of the house were “relatively” warmer than other parts of the 
house and warmer than other homes in the complex.36  The Court held that 
the use of the thermal imaging device to scan the home was a Fourth 
Amendment search because the officers used sensory-enhancing technology 
to discover information that otherwise would not have been known without 
actual intrusion into the most protected sphere, the home.37  Further, the 
Court explained that the Fourth Amendment needs to be interpreted in a 
manner that can serve both “public interests” and “the interests and rights of 
individual citizens.”38  Although the thermal imaging technology “was rela-
tively crude,” the Court’s rule accounted for the “more sophisticated sys-
tems” that have since been developed or are in the process of being devel-
oped.39 
With the increase in technological capabilities, courts have addressed 
questions as to when a search has been conducted using technology, and if 
that search was reasonable.40  In Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City 
of Naperville,41 for example, the City of Naperville received 11 million dol-
lars to upgrade their energy grid in 2009, allowing them to replace their old 
                                                          
 31.  Justice Harlan noted that a telephone booth “is a temporarily private place whose mo-
mentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.”  Id. at 
361.  
 32.  533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
 33.  Id. at 29.  
 34.  Id. Cultivating marijuana indoors requires a significant amount of heat lamps emitting a 
high intensity of heat to ensure the plants are able to thrive.  Id.  
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. at 30.  
 37.  Id. at 40.  
 38.  Id. at 40 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).  
 39.  Id. at 36. The Court further noted, “[I]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance 
of technology.”  Id. at 33–34. 
 40.  See e.g., Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 
2018). 
 41.  Id.  
 68 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [VOL. 78:63 
analog energy readers with digitized smart meters.42  These new smart me-
ters collected data every fifteen minutes—registering the amount of elec-
tricity that was being used inside a home and how often it was being used.43  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the 
public utility’s collection of residents’ energy usage every fifteen minutes 
was a search, but it was reasonable because the data was collected to ad-
vance public purposes.44  The court explained, “The touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”45  As such, the court assessed 
whether the search was reasonable by balancing the privacy intrusion on the 
individual against the policy interests advanced by the government.46  The 
Court stated individuals “have a privacy interest in their energy-
consumption,” but because the public utility was collecting the data and not 
law enforcement, law enforcement could not easily access records of an in-
dividual’s energy consumption.47 
The Supreme Court has also considered whether the attachment of a 
global-positioning-system (“GPS”) to an individual’s vehicle is a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.48  In United States v. Jones,49 the defendant 
was under suspicion for trafficking narcotics.50  A joint task-force between 
the FBI and Metropolitan Police Department targeted the defendant using a 
variety of surveillance tactics, such as visual surveillance, video surveil-
lance, pen registers, and wiretapping the defendant’s cell phone.51  The in-
formation obtained from these surveillance techniques led the government 
to apply for a warrant for the purpose of placing an “electronic tracking de-
vice” on the defendant’s vehicle, which was registered to his wife.52  In the 
four weeks this device was attached to the vehicle, over 2000 pages of data 
were generated.53  The Court held that installing the GPS device on the ve-
hicle and using the device to track the defendant’s movements was a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.54  The Court clarified that the device granted 
                                                          
 42.  Id. at 524. 
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id. at 527–28. 
 45.  Id. at 528 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).  
 46.  Id. at 528 (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004)).   
 47.  Id.  
 48.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).  
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 403.  The defendant was charged with “conspiracy to distribute and possess with 
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base.”  Id.  
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id.  The warrant required that the device be installed within ten days of approval, but the 
warrant was installed on the eleventh day and outside of the District of Columbia.  Id.   
 53.  Id. at 403.  
 54.  Id. at 404.  
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the government the opportunity to “physically occup[y] private property for 
the purpose of” gathering relevant information related to the investigation.55 
The Supreme Court recently analyzed how to apply the Fourth 
Amendment to cell site location signals that had been collected over time 
and if the government needed a warrant to obtain this information.56  In 
Carpenter v. United States,57 the government used the Stored Communica-
tions Act58 to access the defendant’s cell phone records.59  The defendant 
was charged with robbery and carrying a firearm, and the government 
sought the cell site location information from the four-month period during 
which the robberies had occurred.60  The Court concluded that the govern-
ment’s access to the cell site location information was a Fourth Amendment 
search because reasonable expectations of privacy extend to a person’s 
“physical movements as captured through” cell site location information.61  
Further, the Court noted that because obtaining these records was a search, 
a warrant was necessary.62  The Court explained it was unwilling to “grant 
the state unrestricted access to a wireless carrier’s database of physical loca-
tion information.”63  It noted that the rule it was adopting took into consid-
eration the growth of modern technology.64  The Court noted that this case 
was “not about ‘using a phone’ or a person’s movement at a particular 
time,” but rather this case was about the signals that created “a detailed 
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every 
movement, over several years.”65 
                                                          
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
 57.  138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 58.  18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).  
 59.  This statute allows the government “to compel the disclosure of certain telecommunica-
tions records when it ‘offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe’ that the records sought ‘are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal in-
vestigation.’”  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012)).  
 60.  Id. (“[T]he government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging [defendant’s] move-
ments—an average of 101 data points per day.”).  
 61.  Id. at 2217.  The Court explained that prior to the digital age, society would not have ex-
pected law enforcement to be able to “secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of 
an individual’s car for a very long period” (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (Alito, 
J., concurring)).  Id. 
 62.   Id. at 2221.   
 63.  Id. at 2223.  The Court elaborated that “the progress of science has afforded law en-
forcement a powerful new tool to carry out its important responsibilities.”  Id.  Yet, “this tool risks 
Government encroachment of the sort the Framers . . . drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.”  
Id.   
 64.  Id. at 2218 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).  
 65.  Id. at 2220.  The Court also clarified that cell phone location information is not shared 
voluntarily because cell phones maintain such a vital role in society, explaining that “carrying one 
is indispensable to participation in modern society.”  Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2484 (1914)).   
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B.  The Legislative Shaping of ALPR Boundaries 
As the number of license plate reader systems used by law enforce-
ment agencies continues to grow, some state legislatures have developed 
legislative solutions to prevent the misuse of the data, provided public over-
sight, and regulated the type of data that can be collected and stored.66  
Many states have also included measures regarding the length of time that 
data can be stored, ranging from days to months to years.67  New Hamp-
shire, for example, has one of the shortest retention policies—while Colo-
rado and Georgia have two of the longest.68 
Both New Hampshire and Montana have included in their legislation 
standards for what constitutes reasonable suspicion based on ALPR alerts.69  
In Montana, an officer “shall develop independent reasonable suspicion for 
the stop” or visually confirm the plate matches the alert.70  Similar to Mon-
tana, New Hampshire requires officers to independently develop reasonable 
suspicion or make a visual confirmation of the plate number.71  However, 
New Hampshire also requires that if the plates do match, then the officer 
should also make an inquiry into the National Crime Information Center 
Database.72 
In an effort to protect privacy, some states have attempted to establish 
a system that allows the public to gain insight into the functionality and the 
use of ALPR devices in that state, either in the form of statistical analysis or 
public logs.73  Other states require independent audits or reports to be made 
                                                          
 66.  See infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.  
 67.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-118(1) (2017) (prohibiting the storage of captured 
plate data for longer than 90 days); MINN. STAT. § 13.824(3)(a) (2015) (restricting the storage of 
data for more than 60 days from the date of collection); CAL. VEH. CODE § 2413(b) (2011) (limit-
ing the storage of data to 60 days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183.32 (2015) (limiting captured data to 
90 days); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2004(1)(c) (2014) (allowing data to be stored for up to nine 
months); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1804(a) (2016) (stating that ALPR data “shall not be pre-
served for more than one hundred fifty (150) days”).  
 68.  Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b(VIII) (2017) (stating that collected license 
plate reads must be deleted within three minutes of being captured, “unless an alarm resulted in an 
arrest, a citation, or protective custody, or identified a vehicle that was the subject of a missing 
person or wanted broadcast”), and ME. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A(5) (2009) (stating that scans that 
“are not considered intelligence . . . investigative record[s] . . . or data collected for the purposes 
of commercial motor vehicle screening, [and] may not be stored for more than 21 days”), with 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-113(2)(a) (West 2015) (requiring data to be deleted after three 
years) and NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-3204(1) (2018) (restricting the storage of data to no more than 
180 days). 
 69.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-117(vi)(A–B); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b(VI). 
 70.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-117(vi)(A–B).   
 71.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b(VI–VII ). 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.824(5)(a)(1–4) (West 2015) (requiring a public log to be 
maintained, including “specific times of day the reader actively collected data; the aggregate 
number of vehicles or license plates on which  data are collected for each period of active use and 
a list of all state and federal databases with which the data were compared, unless the existence of 
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to the legislative body each year.74  These audits can be used to identify pat-
terns of noncompliance in law enforcement departments.75  
Several states have also explicitly defined who may access the data-
base.76  For example, Maryland restricts access to captured plate data unless 
the law enforcement agency has a “legitimate law enforcement purpose” for 
utilizing the data collected.77  Many states have also included limitations on 
how the data can be used in an attempt to ensure the privacy of the data be-
ing collected.78  As an example, Arkansas limits the use of license plate 
readers to state, county, or municipal law enforcement agencies for the pur-
pose of comparing “captured plate data with data held by the Office of Mo-
tor Vehicle, the Arkansas Crime Information Center [and] the National 
Crime Information Center.”79  In contrast, Oklahoma authorizes law en-
forcement departments to use ALPRs “to access and collect data for the in-
                                                          
the database itself is not public”) and ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1805(a)(1–2) (2013)  (requiring 
any entity using an ALPR system to “[c]ompile statistical data” that is to be made into a format 
where the general public can review the data, which is to be preserved for eighteen months).   
 74.  See CAL. VEH. CODE § 2413(e) (West 2011) (mandating that the California Highway Pa-
trol monitors the ALPR system to ensure that there is no unauthorized access and requiring annual 
reports to be submitted to the California legislature outlining the “number of LPR data disclosures, 
a record of the agencies to which data was disclosed and for what purpose, and any changes in 
policy that affect privacy concerns”); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-509(e)(1–6) (Supp. 
2018) (requiring the Department of State Police and the Maryland Coordination and Analysis 
Center to report “to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, 
and the Legislative Policy Committee,” the number of ALPR devices used in the state, the number 
of devices submitting data to the Center, the number of retained readings, the number of requests 
for data, data breaches or unauthorized uses, and a list of the completed audits).  
 75.  See MINN. STAT. § 13.824(6)(b) (noting that “[t]he results of the audit are public . . . [and 
i]f the commissioner determines that there is a pattern of substantial noncompliance . . . by the law 
enforcement agency, the agency must immediately suspend operation of all automated license 
plate reader devices until the commissioner has authorized the agency to reinstate their use”).   
 76.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-117(2)(a)(i–ii) (stating that the Department of Transporta-
tion or an incorporated city or town “may use a license plate reader” for the purpose of collecting 
data for planning or regulating parking in a parking system); ME. STAT. tit. 29, § 2117-A(3)(A–C) 
(2013) (allowing the Department of Transportation, Department of Public Safety, Bureau of State 
Police and “[a]ny state, county or municipal law enforcement agency” to use automated license 
plate readers for specific purposes).  
 77.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-509(b)(1); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-
117(v)(A–G) (requiring law enforcement to use ALPR devices “only to scan, detect, and identify 
a license plate number for the purpose of identifying” vehicles associated with a crime).  
 78.  See ME. STAT. tit. 29, § 2117-A(4) (classifying the collected data as confidential so that it 
can only be used by law enforcement to “carry[] out its functions or by an agency collecting in-
formation . . . for its intended purpose”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b(1) (2016) (stating that 
an ALPR “shall be installed for the sole purpose of recording and checking license plates and shall 
not be capable of photographing or recording or producing images of the occupants of a motor 
vehicle”).   
 79.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1803(b)(1) (2013); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-
2003(2)(a) (stating ALPR devices can be used “by a law enforcement agency for the purpose of 
protecting public safety, conducting criminal investigations, or ensuring compliance with local, 
state, and federal laws”).  
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vestigation, detection, analysis or enforcement of Oklahoma’s Compulsory 
Insurance Law.”80  
As license plate reader technology continues to develop, states have 
sought to draft guidelines on how these devices can be used in a way that 
will preserve the goals of law enforcement, but also ensure that individual 
privacy will not be infringed.81  These trends, however, have only started to 
begin to develop in states through piecemeal legislation, and even in the 
2019 state legislative sessions, only two states have proposed ALPR regula-
tions.82  While the proposed and enacted legislative pieces are an important 
step, federal legislation in this area can lead to more widespread regulations 
protecting individual privacy.83 
C.  ALPR Alerts Are Sufficient to Establish Reasonable Suspicion But 
Are Not Immune from Error 
While only two states have explicitly defined what constitutes reason-
able suspicion for ALPR alerts, several state courts have considered wheth-
er license plate reader system alerts are sufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion for a traffic stop.84  Generally, an officer can make a traffic stop if 
the officer reasonably believes that criminal activity “may be afoot.”85  In 
Traft v. Commonwealth,86 the defendant was operating his vehicle on a pub-
lic road when an ALPR device that was mounted on an officer’s vehicle 
read his license plate.87  The officer was alerted that the registered owner of 
the vehicle was the subject of a warrant for failure to appear in court.88 
The Kentucky Supreme Court analyzed whether the defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in either his license plate or the infor-
mation the officer obtained from the ALPR alert.89  The Traft court relied 
on the two-part test developed in Katz to conclude that the State did not vio-
late defendant’s Fourth Amendment protections because the defendant did 
                                                          
 80.  47 OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-606.1(C)(1) (2017).  
 81.  See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 82.  See, e.g., S. 40, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (limiting the use of ALPR de-
vices to state and local law enforcement departments and establishing that data cannot “be used or 
shared for any other purpose and shall not be preserved for more than one hundred eighty days”); 
H.R. 73, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2019) (proposing a bill that authorizes a law enforcement 
officer to use “the motor vehicle insurance verification system to enforce motor vehicle liability 
insurance” and noting that an officer can only use the verification system to conduct a stop, but 
cannot use the system to stop a person to conduct a traffic stop unless the officer has reasonable 
suspicion other laws have been violated).  
 83.  See infra Section II.C.  
 84.  Traft v. Commonwealth, 539 S.W.3d 647 (Ky. 2018).  
 85.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  
 86.  539 S.W.3d 647 (Ky. 2018). 
 87.  Id. at 648.  
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 649.  
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not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his license plate.90  There 
was no reasonable expectation of privacy because the license plate was dis-
played on the outside of his vehicle, as required by law.91  Although the de-
fendant argued that his warrant was “protected information,” the court con-
cluded that it was simply public record.92  Therefore, an active warrant 
against the owner of a vehicle is sufficient to establish the necessary rea-
sonable suspicion needed to conduct a traffic stop.93  The court continued, 
explaining the ALPR read of the license plate constituted no constitutional 
violation of any reasonable expectation of privacy because there is no ex-
pectation of privacy in a publicly displayed license plate.94 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also con-
sidered the potential for error and misuse that could arise in using ALPR 
devices to aid law enforcement.95  In Green v. City of San Francisco,96 the 
appellant was operating her 1992 burgundy Lexus with license plate num-
ber “5SOW350” in San Francisco at night. 97  At approximately 11:15 p.m., 
her license plate was misread by an ALPR system, causing her vehicle to be 
mistakenly identified as stolen.98  Another officer observed the appellant’s 
vehicle pass him and noticed the first three numbers of the license plate 
matched the description to both the license plate and the vehicle description 
that had been dispatched over the radio.99  The officer followed the appel-
lant and stopped her, but at no point did he “visually confirm” the license 
                                                          
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id. at 650.  
 93.  Id. at 651. 
 94.  Id.; see also United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 951, 957–58 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding the 
officer had reasonable suspicion in part because the ALPR system automated what could other-
wise be done manually either through typing the numbers into a law-enforcement database or con-
tacting dispatch to confirm); Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 738 S.E.2d 116, 118–19 (Ga. App. 2013) 
(holding the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the ALPR alert in part because the ALPR 
system “merely aided the officer by augmenting his sensory faculties, providing an enhanced abil-
ity to process tag information through a law-enforcement database”); Hill v. State, 743 S.E.2d 
489, 491 (Ga. App. 2013) (“[V]isual surveillance of vehicles in plain view does not constitute an 
unreasonable search for Fourth Amendment purposes, even if the surveillance is aided by an of-
ficer’s use of a license plate tag reader, because a defendant does not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in a plainly visible license plate”).   
 95.  Green v. City of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 96.  751 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 97.  Id. at 1042. 
 98.  Id.  The officers whose ALPR system misread the license plate were unable to read the 
ALPR photograph or “get a direct visual of [the appellant’s] license plate.”  Id.  Because the offic-
ers had a suspect in custody, they dispatched the hit over the radio in case other officers nearby 
could respond.  Id. at 1042–43.  The officers read the license plate identified by the ALPR system 
as “5SOW750,” describing the vehicle as a “dark Lexus.”  Id. at 1043.  However, the radioing of-
ficer did not indicate whether he had visually confirmed the license plate matched the ALPR alert.  
Id.  
 99.  Id.   
 74 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [VOL. 78:63 
plate number, despite the fact “nothing obscured his ability to do so.”100  
The court held in part that it could not be established as a matter of law that 
the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.101  The 
court explained that the San Francisco Police Department did not have any 
policy specifying whether the camera car operator was solely responsible 
for ensuring that the ALPR read was accurate.102  The court elaborated that 
the facts were in dispute as to whether or not the officer “could reasonably 
rely on a lack of qualifying information from the camera car operator” to 
support a decision to stop the vehicle without the officer conducting his 
own “independent verification” of the license plate.103 
Many state courts have found that ALPR alerts are sufficient to estab-
lish reasonable suspicion, but there are still situations where the ALPR alert 
is not enough for reasonable suspicion and the officer needs to take confir-
mation steps before initiating a traffic stop.104  Further, states enacting legis-
lation with guidelines for when an ALPR alert constitutes reasonable suspi-
cion highlights the importance of ensuring officers are stopping the correct 
vehicles.105 
D.  Privacy Implications of License Plate Data Storage 
The Virginia Supreme Court recently distinguished license plate num-
bers from the actual personal information that is associated with the license 
plate data collected by an ALPR device.106  In Neal v. Fairfax County Po-
lice Department,107 the petitioner submitted a Freedom of Information Act 
request to the Fairfax County Police Department seeking the automated li-
cense plate reader records for his vehicle.108  The petitioner sought to end 
the police department practice of passively collecting and storing the license 
plate data of individuals that were under no suspicion of criminal activi-
ty.109  The Virginia Supreme Court analyzed whether the information that 
was being stored by the police department violated the state’s Data Collec-
                                                          
 100.  Id. at 1043.  The officer also did not confirm the plate number with dispatch.  Id.  
 101.  Id. at 1046. 
 102.  Id.  But see People v. Davila, 901 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding the officer 
did have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle based on the ALPR alert in part be-
cause the department’s guidelines were not law, but simply recommendations and the officer was 
not required to perform the steps in order for reasonable suspicion to exist).   
 103.  Id. at 1046. 
 104.  See note 97 and accompanying text.  But see notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
 105.  See text accompanying notes 70–72.   
 106.  Neal v. Fairfax Cty. Police Dept., 812 S.E.2d 444 (Va. 2018).  
 107.  812 S.E.2d 444 (Va. 2018).  
 108.  Id. at 445.   
 109.  Id. at 446.  The practice the petitioner aimed to stop is known as the passive collection of 
data.  Id.  In contrast, “active use” refers to running “real time check[s] of license plate numbers 
against a ‘hot list’ of license plate numbers to quickly identify vehicles that have been reported 
stolen, missing, or suspected of involvement in a crime.”  Id. at 446 n.1.  
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tion Act.110  The court held that the license plate numbers that were stored 
in the ALPR database were not personal information as per the Data Collec-
tion Act, but the pictures and data associated with each license plate number 
were personal information.111  The court reasoned that license plate num-
bers do “not describe, locate or index anything about an individual.”112  As 
for the data and images associated with the plate number, the court ex-
plained that the “images of the vehicle, its license plate, and the vehicle’s 
immediate surroundings, along with the GPS location, time, and date when 
the image was captured,” allows for inferences to be made about the indi-
vidual owner of the vehicle regarding their daily activities, routes, or any 
other information that may be gleaned from having access to those types of 
records. 113 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
has also considered the potential impact of releasing information about the 
functioning of license plate readers and their locations.114  In New York Civ-
il Liberties Union v. Department of Homeland Security,115 the plaintiffs 
sought data through a Freedom of Information Act request to the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security.116  The State argued that while it was public 
knowledge that these cameras were placed throughout Lower Manhattan, 
revealing the specific camera locations would allow criminals to identify 
ways to “evad[e] detection and . . . circumvent[] the law.”117  The court de-
nied the release of the documents, holding that the capabilities of these de-
vices are “generally known,” but the functionalities and the abilities that 
these devices have, such as how they transmit data, are unknown.118  The 
court elaborated that releasing details about the specifics of the devices 
                                                          
 110.  Id. at 446.  The purpose of the Data Act is to “‘preserve the rights guaranteed a citizen in 
a free society’ by ‘establish[ing] procedures to govern information systems containing records on 
individuals.’”  Id. at 448 (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800(B)(4) 
(2018)).   
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id. at 450.  Additionally, license plate numbers only identify the owner of the vehicle, 
which may not always be an individual.  Id.   
 113.  Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3801 (2018)).  The Court also emphasized that the 
classification of pictures and associated data as personal information was “consistent with the leg-
islature’s intent to remedy the potential mischief posed by ‘the extensive collection, maintenance, 
use and dissemination of personal information.’”  Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800(B)(1)). 
 114.  N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 771 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011).  
 115.  771 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 116.  Id. at 290.  They requested the release of documents that were related to the Lower Man-
hattan Security Initiative.  Id.   
 117.  Id. at 292.   
 118.  Id.   
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could allow criminals to “identify limitations” and exploit vulnerabilities in 
the devices. 119 
The Supreme Court of California has also clarified the difference be-
tween collecting data for the pure purpose of collecting license plate infor-
mation and collecting data for use in a criminal investigation.120  In Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California v. Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County,121 the petitioners sought data over a one-week 
period from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and the Los Angeles Po-
lice Department.122  The court held that the indiscriminate scanning of li-
cense plates did “not produce records of investigations” because the scans 
were not conducted pursuant to any inquiries of specific crimes.123  The 
court elaborated that plate scans fell into a category of “bulk data collec-
tion” even if the scanned plates had the “potential to match a future search 
query.”124 
As the California Supreme Court noted, ALPR devices have the poten-
tial to generate a significant amount of personal information about individ-
uals—prompting concern about the potential intrusions on individual priva-
cy.125  In United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor issued a concurrence to 
express her concerns regarding the increase in the capabilities of technology 
available to law enforcement and how that prompts reconsideration of the 
meaning of societal reasonable expectations of privacy.126  Justice So-
tomayor explained that when defining reasonable expectations of privacy, 
the question to ask should be “whether people reasonably expect that their 
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the 
government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious 
                                                          
 119.  Id.  Additionally, disclosing this information “could also nullify the deterrent effect cre-
ated by the absence of information concerning the scope of the surveillance . . . measures.”  Id. at 
293.  
 120.  Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. of S. Cal. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cty., 400 P.3d 432 
(Cal. 2017).  
 121.  400 P.3d 432 (Cal. 2017).  
 122.  Id. at 435.  In one week, more than one million license plates had been read.  Id.  The 
purpose of the request was to examine “the legal and policy implications of the government’s use 
of ALPRs to collect vast amounts of information on almost exclusively law-abiding [citizens of 
Los Angeles].”  Id. at 434 (alteration in original) (quoting the petitioners’ request for ALPR data 
through the California Public Records Act).  The Los Angeles Police Department retains the in-
formation for five years, whereas Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department retains the information for 
two years.  Id. at 435.  
 123.  Id. at 438.  
 124.  Id. at 438.  The Court acknowledged that bulk collection of data is not exempt but re-
manded the issue of anonymization and redaction of the plate data to the trial court to determine 
how the data should be disclosed.  Id. at 442.  
 125.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); United 
States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., dissenting).  
 126.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”127  Further, she noted that as society be-
comes more aware of the various abilities of the government to “watch” cit-
izens, then this action has the potential to “chill[] associational and expres-
sive freedoms.”128 
Justice Sotomayor further noted that if the government is unrestrained 
in its abilities to collect the most “private aspects of [personal] identity,” 
this can lead to the data being “susceptible to abuse.”129  As noted in both 
Neal and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern Califor-
nia, ALPR devices have the ability to aggregate large amounts of data that 
can reveal intimate details about individuals.130  Justice Sotomayor also 
wrote, “The Government can store . . . records and efficiently mine them for 
information years into the future.”131  Justice Sotomayor’s concern was 
more than just theory: in American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 
Southern California, the Los Angeles Police Department primarily collect-
ed and retained license plate reader data because of the potential it had to 
match a future crime inquiry.132 
Additionally, even though individuals generally do not have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in their license plates, there is still a potential 
for privacy intrusions based on how the license plate data is stored and 
used.133  In United States v. Ellison,134 Judge Moore, of the Sixth Circuit, 
dissented to discuss the Fourth Amendment concerns that arise with the use 
of ALPR devices.135  Judge Moore noted, “the constitutional concerns re-
garding abuse of discretion do not disappear simply because the drivers are 
not stopped.”136  In particular, she noted there is a serious psychological in-
vasion associated with the knowledge that police officers are able to search 
“one’s personal information . . . for no reason, at any time one is driv-
ing.”137  Additionally, she highlighted the potential for error that is inherent 
with technology, such as computer errors that may result in drivers being 
                                                          
 127.  Id. at 416–17 (noting that a goal of the Fourth Amendment is “to curb arbitrary exercises 
of police power and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance’” (citing United States v. Di Re, 
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948))).   
 128.  Id. at 416. 
 129.  Id. (noting “[t]he net result [of] GPS monitoring . . . may ‘alter the relationship between 
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society’” (quoting United States v. 
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring))).  
 130.  See text accompanying supra notes 116 and 121–124 (noting the details that can be re-
vealed about individuals when ALPR devices are deployed in large numbers in communities).  
 131.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 415.  
 132.  Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. of S. Cal. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 400 
P.3d 432, 438 (Cal. 2017). 
 133.  United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., dissenting).  
 134.  462 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 135.  Id. at 567 (Moore, J., dissenting).  
 136.  Id. at 568.  
 137.  Id.  
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stopped based on inaccurate ALPR data.138  As society becomes more reli-
ant on the abilities of computers to store and process information more 
quickly, then that amplifies the potential for error.  Therefore, there needs to 
be a mechanism in place to check these risks to ensure errors are minimal. 
139  
II.  ANALYSIS 
As the number of license plate readers continues to increase, the judi-
ciary is constrained in its ability to address adequately the complex privacy 
issues that they implicate.140  Even though license plate readers provide a 
substantial benefit to law enforcement agencies, that benefit should not 
come at the cost of individual privacy.141  Current Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence is ineffective at providing a sufficient remedy to protect indi-
vidual civil liberties that may be infringed upon with the increased usage of 
ALPR devices.142  Section II.A argues that the Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence is ineffective at addressing the complex privacy issues that arise with 
cases concerning ALPR devices.  Section II.B argues that the legislature is 
more equipped to implement regulations that balance privacy interests and 
law enforcement interests. Section II.B also focuses on why Congress is the 
best arena for a legislative solution to the threats posed by ALPR devices.  
Section II.C drafts a model statute that includes the different fundamental 
elements that should be included in ALPR legislation. 
A.  Current Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Is Ineffective to Address 
Complex Privacy Issues 
As more agencies gain access to license plate reader data, courts are 
constrained in applying traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to a 
complex issue.143  Current Fourth Amendment doctrine centers on an indi-
vidual’s “subjective” privacy expectations, society’s “objective reasonable-
ness” of that privacy expectation, and the degree of privacy intrusion.144  
Current doctrine is a product of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. 
United States, but it has been criticized for its failure to keep up with the 
                                                          
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. at 570 (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) 
(noting that “inaccurate data can infect not only one agency, but the many agencies that share ac-
cess to the database”).  
 140.  See infra Section II.A. 
 141.  See infra Section II.B.  
 142.  See infra Section II.A. 
 143.  David Gray, The Fourth Amendment Categorical Imperative, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 
14, 16–17 (2017).  
 144.  Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. 
J.L.TECH & POL’Y 281, 283 (2011). 
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number of technologies that have been introduced to society since the opin-
ion was published.145  Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence is criti-
cized because it has not caught up to the changes in technology and instead 
focuses on older ideas about the more limited capabilities of “public sur-
veillance technologies.”146  Further, “the warrantless use of most surveil-
lance technologies and the collection of personal data fits comfortably with-
in constitutional doctrine.”147  Technological advancement affords the 
government with more options to conduct efficient searches, but it does so 
“on an almost unimaginable scale.”148  Essentially, modern judicial inter-
pretations of Katz grant the government unlimited authority to conduct 
searches of public spaces using surveillance cameras, automated license 
plate readers, drones, and facial recognition technology.149  
Under the current reading of Katz, an individual’s license plate is ex-
posed to the public and ALPR devices are operated in areas where an indi-
vidual has no constitutional right to privacy.150  ALPR devices read publicly 
displayed license plates which grants police officers the freedom to investi-
gate people as they expose their vehicles to the public. 151  While the license 
plates themselves are visible to the public and thus, not subject to any rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, the data associated with the plates, such as 
where the individual is going, the time of their travel, the routes of their 
travel, and the pictures of their vehicle and nearby surroundings, are not vis-
ible to the public.152 
The Supreme Court has also long displayed a reluctance to regulate 
devices that provide a benefit to law enforcement.153   ALPR devices allow 
law enforcement to increase efficiency and focus on other areas of crime 
while still locating criminals quickly.154  Situations involving “efficiency-
enhancing devices” are generally not regulated by the Court, unless it is a 
device that provides law enforcement with extrasensory abilities.155   
                                                          
 145.  Gray, supra note 143, at 15–17.  
 146.  Rushin, supra note 144, at 282. 
 147.  Id. at 283 (“The recording of a person’s movements in public is not especially intrusive 
and certainly does not provide police with any intrusive, extrasensory abilities beyond mere ob-
servation.”).  
 148.  Gray, supra note 143, at 16 (emphasis added). 
 149.  Id. at 16–17.  
 150.  Michael E. Fisher, Ohio Is Jonesing for Automatic License Plate Readers: Why This May 
Violate Your Fourth Amendment Rights and What The Ohio Legislature Should Do About It, 64 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 329, 336 (2016). 
 151.  Stephen Rushin, The Legislative Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 79 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (2013). 
 152.  Neal v. Fairfax Cty. Police Dep’t, 812 S.E.2d 444, 450 (Va. 2018). 
 153.  Rushin, supra note 144, at 305–07; see also Rushin, supra note 151, at 32 (noting that 
“[t]he Court has long displayed a reluctance to regulate police efficiency”). 
 154.  Rushin, supra note 144, at 292–93. 
 155.  Rushin, supra note 151, at 32; see also Kyllo v. United States 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) 
(holding that when “the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore the 
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Kyllo v. United States and Katz both highlighted the potential for in-
tangible data to be protected by the Court, but ALPR devices are also 
unique from the wiretapping at issue in Katz and the thermo-imaging device 
at issue in Kyllo.156  ALPR devices are distinct technologies because these 
devices provide a significant benefit to law enforcement that would other-
wise be completed in a much slower fashion.157  Further, the aggregated da-
ta is collected based on an individual driving on public roads where the in-
dividual is exposing themselves to the public, which further restricts ALPR 
devices from sitting comfortably within current doctrine.158 
Current privacy jurisprudence and its relationship to ALPR devices or 
other forms of massive data collection have generated concern from Su-
preme Court Justices, circuit court judges, and other individuals.159  Nota-
bly, in United States v. Jones,160 two Supreme Court justices concurred ex-
pressing concern regarding how the most seemingly normal surveillance 
can result in the collection of massive amounts of data which can lead to a 
“potentially unconstitutional invasion of individual privacy.”161  Although 
ALPR devices and GPS devices are different because GPS devices track 
every single movement whereas ALPR devices are tracking the movement 
of every single vehicle traveling on a certain road, at a certain time, or in a 
                                                          
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant”).  
 156.  See supra text accompanying notes 26–39.  
 157.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the increased capabilities of law en-
forcement when ALPR devices are in use).  
 158.  See infra notes 159–166 and accompanying text (discussing mass data collection and 
how it might prompt reconsideration of the notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy).  
 159.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and . . . evades 
the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources 
and community hostility.’” (citing Illinois v. Lidster 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004))); United States v. 
Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that the main issue be-
fore the court was whether law enforcement can “conduct a search using the license-plate number 
to access information about the vehicle and its operator that may not otherwise be public or acces-
sible by the police without heightened suspicion”); Kim Zetter, Even the FBI Had Privacy Con-
cerns on License Plate Readers, WIRED (May 15, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/05/even-fbi-privacy-concerns-license-plate-readers/ (explaining that 
the American Civil Liberties Union obtained documents from the FBI’s Office of General Counsel 
“grappling with concerns about the agency’s use of the technology and the apparent lack of a co-
hesive government policy to protect the civil liberties of citizens whose vehicles are photographed 
by the readers”); see also notes 125–139 and accompanying text (describing the privacy concerns 
raised by Justice Sotomayor and Judge Ellison). 
 160.  In this case, the government placed a GPS tracker to the undercarriage of the defendant’s 
wife’s vehicle to support the government’s case that the defendant was involved in narcotics traf-
ficking.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012).   
 161.  Rushin, supra note 151, at 11; see Rushin, supra note 144, at 308–09 (noting that the 
Seventh Circuit has stated “[t]echnological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an ex-
tent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive” (quoting United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007)).  
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certain location.162 A community with enough ALPR systems, however, 
“could ultimately create an accurate and pervasive record of a person’s 
movements over months, or even years.”163  Judge Posner of the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that if the government “someday decide[s] 
to institute a program of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will 
be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be inter-
preted to treat such surveillance as a search.”164  
Technological changes have highlighted the gaps that exist within the 
Katz doctrine because “[n]ew technology may provide increased conven-
ience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the 
tradeoff worthwhile.”165  Yet, the expansion of efficiency-enhancing tech-
nologies have resulted in the creation of a “digitally efficient investigative 
state” that has become so intrusive on individual privacy that the Court 
needs to amend Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to account for the chang-
es in society.166  With ALPR data, the question becomes whether an indi-
vidual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information associated 
with their license plate in an aggregated ALPR database.167  The gaps in 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence created by the “reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test” in Katz serve as a barrier to privacy protections when 
ALPR devices are unregulated because the courts lack the means to develop 
a sufficient solution.168   The Supreme Court reviews only the information 
before it when deciding how to achieve the ideal “constitutional balance” 
between privacy and liberty, but the Court’s limited scope of review con-
strains the Court into crafting solutions that are within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.169 
Recently, in Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court indicated 
the potential to expand the definition of privacy to account for changes in 
technology.170  The Court took care to ensure that this decision would be 
narrowly applied to only cell site location information.171  The Court em-
                                                          
 162.  See supra notes 120–133 and accompanying text.   
 163.  Rushin, supra note 144, at 286.  
 164.  Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.   
 165.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that even if peo-
ple are hesitant to accept the changes in technology that “they may eventually reconcile them-
selves to this development as inevitable”).  
 166.  Rushin, supra note 151, at 3.  
 167.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 237.  
 168.  Laura K. Donohue, Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 553, 685 (2017); see also Rushin, supra note 151, at 50 (finding that “[t]he Supreme Court is 
institutionally limited in its capacity to develop a response to the digitally efficient investigative 
state”).  
 169.  Stephen E. Henderson, Carpenter v. United States and the Fourth Amendment: The Best 
Way Forward, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 495, 520 (2017); see infra note 178.  
 170.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
 171.  See supra notes 56–65 and accompanying text.   
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phasized “the progress of science” has allowed law enforcement to use a 
“powerful new tool” to carry out law enforcement duties, but at the same 
time, these new tools create risks that that the Fourth Amendment was de-
signed to prevent.172  Additionally, the cell site location signals at issue in 
Carpenter are distinct from the data generated by an ALPR device because 
individuals “regularly leave their vehicles,” but a cell phone “faithfully fol-
lows its owner beyond public thoroughfares.”173  Although Carpenter is 
useful, the Court was careful to narrowly apply its reasoning only to cell 
site location information, specifically stating that this decision did not “call 
into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as securi-
ty cameras.”174  Nonetheless, privacy advocates, like the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), viewed the Court’s reasoning as “open[ing] the 
door to the protection of the many other kinds of data generated by popular 
technologies.”175  The ACLU explained that Carpenter could potentially 
impact government access to various types of “popular technolog[y]” and 
the information obtained from those technologies.176 
As society continues to rapidly advance with technology, technology 
places “privacy and liberty norms in flux” and “police should seek the as-
sistance of legislatures in governing investigatory methods, and they must 
seek the approval of courts.”177  However, the courts are an arena “of re-
view, not of first view,” further limiting their ability to construct adequate 
solutions to protect individual privacy.178  The Court is limited by the cur-
rent doctrine that is incompatible with the rapidly evolving technological 
state and cannot act on its own to create an effective solution that will be 
beneficial to both law enforcement and individual privacy interests.179 
B.  The Legislature Needs to Act to Protect Both Privacy and Law 
Enforcement Interests 
Given the existing constraints on the judiciary, the federal legislative 
branch is in the best position to implement a comprehensive statute that 
provides a guideline as to how ALPR devices should be regulated to ensure 
                                                          
 172.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.  
 173.  Id. at 2218.  The Court also highlighted that government locational tracking “achieves 
near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.” Id.  
 174.  Id. at 2220. 
 175.  Nathan Freed Wessler, The Supreme Court’s Groundbreaking Privacy Victory for the 
Digital Age, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (June 22, 2018, 2:30 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/location-tracking/supreme-courts-groundbreaking-
privacy-victory-digital-age. 
 176.  Id.  
 177.  Henderson, supra note 169, at 521 (emphasis omitted). 
 178.  Id. at 522; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining “concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to pro-
tect against these intrusions”). 
 179.  Rushin, supra note 151, at 4.  
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that individual privacy interests are respected and that law enforcement is 
not constrained in their ability to investigate and solve crime.180  Section 
II.B.1 discusses the unique challenges associated with ALPR devices, high-
lighting both the privacy concerns and the interests of law enforcement.  
Section II.B.2 focuses on how Congress is more equipped than the states to 
implement a federal statute given the intricacies of ALPR devices and the 
potential for the data to be transmitted across state lines, thus hindering the 
effectiveness of any single state regulation or protection on how the data 
can be used, stored, or accessed. 
1.  The Creation of a Statutory Scheme Will Require Input from 
Law Enforcement and Privacy Advocates to Create a Balanced 
Solution 
License plate readers allow law enforcement officers to carry out their 
duties more efficiently.181  With this increased efficiency, officers are able 
to issue more traffic citations, locate stolen vehicles, identify drivers with 
suspended licenses, and discern vehicles that violate state emission laws.182  
Further, ALPR device surveillance is useful because of its ability to deter 
illegal behavior.183  Although ALPR devices increase law enforcement effi-
ciency, other organizations, such as the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, have found that ALPR devices amass significant quantities of 
data, but are not locating vehicles or individuals associated with violent or 
serious crimes.184  Law enforcement agencies fear that legislative solutions 
                                                          
 180.  Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law Enforcement Jumps on the Big Data Bandwagon: Au-
tomated License Plate Recognition Systems, Information Privacy and Access to Government In-
formation, 66 ME. L. REV. 397, 432–33 (2014); see infra Section II.B.2. 
 181.  Id. at 398; see also GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 13 (finding that a single officer in 
Montgomery County, Maryland was able to read “48,000 vehicles in 96-hour periods . . . across 
27 days”).  
 182.  See GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 13 (noting that one Montgomery County, Mary-
land police officer was able to “issue[] 255 traffic citations, identif[y] 26 drivers with suspended 
licenses, ca[tch] 16 vehicle-emissions violators, [and] f[i]nd four stolen vehicles”); see also 
ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 4, at 23 (reporting that the Automated Regional Justice In-
formation Sharing system conducted a five day test at the United States—Mexico border, where 
780,000 plates were read, “and over 1,300 were involved in 4 murders, 14 rapes, 24 robberies, 273 
assaults, 128 burglaries, 345 vehicle thefts, 361 weapons, and 241 narcotics cases”). 
 183.  See Rushin, supra note 144, at 297 (finding that individuals will “avoid[] illegal behavior 
in the vicinity where police surveillance is happening or has occurred, but also avoid[] illegal be-
havior generally because of the observed surveillance”).  
 184.  The ACLU requested the license plate records from Maryland’s ALPR database and dis-
covered that of the “over 29 million [plate] reads . . . [o]nly 0.2 percent . . . or about 1 in 500, were 
hits.” AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS 
ARE BEING USED TO RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS 13 (2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/other/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used-
record-americans-movements?redirect=technology-and-liberty/you-are-being-tracked-how-
license-plate-readers-are-being-used-record [hereinafter YOU ARE BEING TRACKED].  In 2012, 
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will result in overly burdensome storage limitations, thus undermining the 
legitimate use of ALPR data and hindering law enforcement’s ability to 
solve crime.185 
Even though ALPR devices allow officers to carry out their duties 
more efficiently, the mass aggregation of citizen data poses a threat to indi-
vidual privacy.186  The Los Angeles Police Chief has described the “real 
value [of ALPR]” as coming “from the long-term investigative uses of be-
ing able to track [all] vehicles—where they’ve been and what they’ve been 
doing.”187  Decreased data storage costs incentivize law enforcement de-
partments to hold onto ALPR data for longer periods of time.188  
“[H]istorical and psychological evidence,” however, has found that unregu-
lated police surveillance has negative consequences.189  Without legislative 
protections, the unregulated nature of automated license plate readers “may 
incentivize police fishing expeditions, facilitate racial profiling, and corrode 
any notion of public anonymity.”190 
2.  Congress Is Better Suited Than the States to Adopt a 
Comprehensive Statutory Scheme Governing ALPR Devices 
Several states have already begun to implement policies related to 
ALPR devices, but this has been a slow, piecemeal process.191  In United 
States v. Jones, Justice Alito noted that in situations “involving dramatic 
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legisla-
tive.”192  As more agencies begin using ALPR devices, the federal legisla-
ture is in the strongest position to evaluate competing interests and to en-
sure ALPR data policy takes into consideration privacy interests and law 
enforcement interests.193  This Section explores why Congress is in the best 
                                                          
“[f]or every one million plates read in Maryland, only 47 were potentially associated with more 
serious crimes.”  Id. at 14.  
 185.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 228.  
 186.  See Cyrus Farivar, We Know Where You’ve Been: Ars Acquires 4.6M License Plate 
Scans from the Cops, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 24, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2015/03/we-know-where-youve-been-ars-acquires-4-6m-license-plate-scans-from-the-
cops/.  A study conducted by ars Technica, in Oakland, CA, found that over 4.6 million scans had 
been read in three years, leading to 1.1 million unique plates being identified.  Id.  Although many 
of the plates had only been read a few times, using a “custom-built visualization tool . . . [a]nyone 
in possession of enough data can often . . . make educated guesses about a target’s home or work-
place, particularly when someone’s movements are consistent.”  Id.   
 187.  Rushin, supra note 144, at 286 (alterations in original).  
 188.  GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 19.  
 189.  Rushin, supra note 151, at 21; see also note 137 and accompanying text (describing the 
effects of surveillance on human behavior).  
 190.  Rushin, supra note 144, at 283; see also infra notes 235–241 (discussing the ways law 
enforcement has used ALPR devices to target certain races and religions). 
 191.  See supra Section I.B. 
 192.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 193.  Id.  
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position and how a comprehensive scheme can be used by the Court to ad-
dress privacy-related challenges to ALPR devices and the collection of data. 
ALPR data is championed by law enforcement as a way to efficiently 
solve crime, yet criticized by privacy advocates as eroding individual con-
cepts of privacy.194  Given these competing tensions, Congress is best suited 
“to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance 
privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”195  Federal legislators 
are able to obtain input from a variety of sources, such as “legislative hear-
ings,” “poll results” and “interest group advocacy.”196  Additionally, the 
legislative process is more open and is accompanied by public scrutiny 
which “tend[s] to ferret out rules that are particularly unbalanced.”197 
A congressional statutory scheme for ALPR data is not unique and 
would not be the first time that Congress has acted to protect individual pri-
vacy.198  At times, Congress has acted on its own initiative to pass legisla-
tion that would protect people from new technologies such as the Privacy 
Act of 1974,199 which allowed people to identify incorrect information 
about themselves in “computer databases.”200  Another example is the fed-
eral wiretapping statute where Congress stepped in instead of allowing the 
courts to “develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law governing that 
complex subject.”201  Also, Congress does not need to wait until an issue 
presents itself; Congress has acted on issues, such as creating the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act,202 even before the court had considered 
whether the Fourth Amendment extends to email privacy.203  Congress has 
the tools and the ability to act to protect individual privacy in relation to the 
aggregation of ALPR data. 
A comprehensive congressional statutory scheme would not only pro-
vide evidence as to societal expectations about privacy, but it would allow 
Congress “to regulate both public and private parties to best protect priva-
cy.”204  Congress has the ability to rely on public opinion and other infor-
mation to craft a multi-dimensional solution that protects individual privacy 
                                                          
 194.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 229. 
 195.  Jones, 565 U.S., at 429–30.  
 196.  Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 875 (2004). 
 197.  Id. at 881.  
 198.  Id. at 871 (explaining that Congress often has the lead with respect to new technology 
and criminal investigations). 
 199.  5 U.S.C. § 522(a) (2000). 
 200.  Id. at 855. 
 201.  Jones, 565 U.S., at 427.   
 202.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended as a note to 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000)). 
 203.  Kerr, supra note 196, at 870.  
 204.  Id. at 872. 
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and respects law enforcement.205  This statutory scheme is also a useful 
guide for the courts in understanding societal expectations about privacy.206  
A federal legislative statute provides courts with actual evidence of how so-
ciety feels about technology and its capabilities.207  A federal legislative so-
lution is also preferable because the Supreme Court favors federal legisla-
tion when determining reasonable expectations of privacy.208  Given the 
complexity of data privacy and the inconsistences in both state courts and 
state legislative statutes, Congress needs to act to create a uniform re-
sponse.209 A uniform federal response is crucial to protecting individual 
privacy because it provides a baseline understanding of legislative evidence 
for the Court to use when considering societal expectations of privacy in-
volving the aggregation of data from law enforcement.210 
C.  A Model Legislative Proposal 
With the implementation of ALPR devices in numerous law enforce-
ment agencies, regulations have developed in piecemeal fashion, sometimes 
with states and jurisdictions adopting no regulations at all.211  As ALPR de-
vices have the potential to gather mass quantities of personal data regarding 
an individual’s daily activities, however, regulation at the federal level be-
comes increasingly necessary.212  Legislative solutions need to consider the 
inherent challenges associated with ALPR devices while still ensuring that 
ALPR devices are not rendered ineffective with overly restrictive legisla-
                                                          
 205.  Id. at 881–82.  
 206.  Colin Shaff, Note, Is the Court Allergic to Katz? Problems Posed by New Methods of 
Electronic Surveillance to the ‘Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy” Test, 23 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 409 (2014).  
 207.  Id. at 440 (explaining that the Court shows deference when Congress enacts “‘compre-
hensive’ federal legislation” (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring))).   
 208.  Id. at 439 (explaining that even when state legislation is “a more accurate representation 
of [individual privacy expectations],” the Court “tends to disregard state legislation”); see also 
Neil Colman McCabe, Legislative Facts as Evidence in State Constitutional Search Analysis, 65 
TEMP. L. REV. 1229, 1240 (1992) (noting that “state and local laws cannot serve as legislative 
facts unless they are representative of a national, rather than merely a statewide, societal under-
standing”).  
 209.  See supra Sections I.C–D.   
 210.  See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1987) (explaining that societal expecta-
tions of privacy “must turn on such factors as ‘our societal understanding that certain areas de-
serve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion’” (quoting Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984))); see also Kerr, supra note 196, at 806 (explaining that “legisla-
tive privacy rules” have been either as protective or more protective, than “parallel Fourth 
Amendment rules”); McCabe, supra note 208, at 1231 (noting that the Court has considered “leg-
islative or social facts” even if the parties have not presented those facts in arguments).  But see 
Shaff, supra note 206, at 444–45 (criticizing the federal legislature for failing to update federal 
privacy laws, thus leaving in place an “outdated understanding of electronic communication”).  
 211.  Rushin, supra note 144, at 286–87.  
 212.  See supra Section II.B.   
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tion.213  Section II.C.1 argues determining who has access to the data and 
how the data can be shared is fundamental to protecting privacy and allow-
ing law enforcement to carry out their duties.  Section II.C.2 focuses on the 
importance of establishing reasonable suspicion guidelines to minimize the 
risk of error and abuse.  Section II.C.3 argues that the lower cost of data 
storage has served as an incentive for law enforcement agencies to adopt 
this technology more broadly, but that regulations need to serve as a com-
promise between citizen privacy and law enforcement investigations.  Sec-
tion II.C.4 discusses the value of public input and audits to ensure that the 
public and the police force are able to determine that the benefits outweigh 
the risks. 
1.  Controlling Access and Sharing Data 
As more law enforcement agencies adopt ALPR devices, Congress 
needs to establish guidance on who can access this information and how it 
is shared with other agencies.214  Legislative solutions should require agen-
cies to adopt policies that focus on how the data should be collected and 
how to use that data in an appropriate manner.215  Any public entity that re-
lies on ALPR devices should draft regulations identifying the employees 
who can access the data while also specifying the training these employees 
need to undergo.216  Specifically stating who can have access to the data can 
ensure that the data is being used appropriately and according to the statuto-
ry mandate.217  These regulations should also define the “allowable uses of 
ALPR technology and data.”218  Additionally, Congress should require law 
enforcement to make these regulations public to increase transparency and 
public awareness about how this data is being handled and protected.219 
American policing is highly decentralized, which has led to an increase 
in sharing license plate data among different jurisdictions.220  The main 
benefit of this decentralized system is that it aids in locating criminals and 
                                                          
 213.  See infra Section II.C.1.   
 214.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 265–66.  
 215.  INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE 
UTILIZATION OF LICENSE PLATE READERS 48 (2009). 
 216.  Fisher, supra note 150, at 349.  
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 265; see also MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-
509(a)(8) (Supp. 2018) (defining “legitimate law enforcement purpose” as “the investigation, de-
tection or analysis of a crime or a violation of the Maryland vehicle laws or the operation of ter-
rorist or missing or endangered persons or alerts”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2003(2)(a) (2014) 
(restricting the use of ALPR devices to law enforcement agencies “for the purpose of protecting 
public safety, conducting criminal investigations, or ensuring compliance with local, state, and 
federal laws”).  
 219.  See Fisher, supra note 150, at 349 (arguing that granting the public access to training pol-
icies increases accountability). 
 220.  Rushin, supra note 151, at 12. 
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stolen property.221  With the increase in automated license plate readers, the 
federal government and state government agencies have developed “fusion 
centers” as a place to store and share data across city and state borders.222  
As the data is shared among state and local governments, the privacy regu-
lations governing in one jurisdiction may no longer apply in another.223  
Agencies that share data with other jurisdictions should work together to 
create “model memoranda of understanding.”224  These memoranda are 
used to work out the details as to how to share hotlist data and other related 
ALPR data.225  Further, if jurisdictions are sharing data, then they should be 
transparent about what other jurisdictions or agencies they are sharing the 
license plate data.226  Any congressional solution should result in a policy 
that considers the privacy risks that exist when data is shared with a multi-
tude of other jurisdictions.227   A federal policy needs to consider both the 
risks that may be associated with sharing data and be sure to take an affirm-
ative action to protect individual’s privacy and ensure jurisdictions and fu-
                                                          
 221.  Id.  
 222.  Rushin, supra note 144, at 292 (explaining fusion centers “were created by Congress as 
central databases for compiling terrorist-related information that could be shared with local law 
enforcement”).  Fusion Centers allow states and large metropolitan areas to operate as “focal 
points for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between feder-
al; state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT); and private sector partners.” State and Major Urban Area 
Fusion Centers, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/state-and-
major-urban-area-fusion-centers. 
 223.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 264–65.  
 224.  GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at xiv; see also Memorandum of Understanding for 
Sharing Law Enforcement Information, CITY OF CHENERY 4–6 (2012), 
https://www.cityofcheney.org/DocumentCenter/View/97/SouthBay-Information-Sharing-
System—Law-Enforcement-Information-Sharing (providing an example of a data-sharing Memo-
randum of Understanding between eight law enforcement departments and the South Bay Infor-
mation Sharing System).  
 225.  GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 66 (explaining that “[n]egotiating such [memoran-
dums of understanding] with other agencies or jurisdictions can both be time-consuming and trou-
blesome . . . [and that] agencies should consider appending LPR agreements to an existing [mem-
orandum of understanding] related to data-sharing” instead of creating a separate one that is only 
for ALPR devices); see also NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, SHARING DATA FOR BETTER RESULTS 15 
(2014), http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2016-
12/Data%20Sharing%20for%20Better%20Results.pdf (explaining that a Memorandum of Under-
standing should include “the agreed upon purpose of the initiative, the human and technological 
implementation plans, and the agreed upon privacy and security protections associated with an 
integrated data system”).  
 226.  YOU ARE BEING TRACKED, supra note 184, at 32.  
 227.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 265–66; see also Andrew Keatts, SDPD Shares Its Li-
cense Plate Database with Border Patrol—and Hundreds of Other Agencies, VOICES OF SAN 
DIEGO (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/public-safety/sdpd-shares-its-
license-plate-database-with-border-patrol-and-hundreds-of-other-agencies/ (noting the San Diego 
Police Department has admitted to having “broad leeway over who can access the data, and that it 
has not elected to limit that access” and “[a]gencies that can see the data range from Border Patrol 
to tiny local police departments across the country”).  
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sion centers are being transparent about how the data is being stored and 
used.228 
As part of protecting privacy, statutes need to include guidance to en-
sure that the data is not being misused and that law enforcement is not using 
the technology as a means of targeting certain classes of individuals.229  
Legislation targeting law enforcement practices must be easy to interpret 
and implement in a variety of different circumstances to prevent law en-
forcement from misunderstanding and misapplying the provisions.230  Even 
if the government does not plan to use the collected data, there is still the 
potential for misuse and the existence of a “chilling effect” on individuals’ 
freedoms.231  This effect has been noted by the International Chiefs of Po-
lice who, in 2009, stated that the unregulated use of ALPR technology may 
result in the public becoming “more cautious in the exercise of their pro-
tected rights of expression, protest, association, and political participation 
because they consider themselves under constant surveillance.”232  As then-
Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana explained, “ALPR systems ‘pose a 
fundamental risk to personal privacy and create large pools of information 
belonging to law abiding citizens.’”233  Additionally, a former police chief 
in Minnesota noted at a city council meeting that ALPR technology is use-
ful and beneficial, but that he did not “want the good guys being kept in a 
database” even if “it helps catch the bad guys.”234 
Moreover, if individuals are aware that their movements are being 
tracked, then this could have a potentially “chilling effect” on people exer-
cising their First Amendment rights.235  The ACLU has noted that the New 
York City Police Department has driven vehicles around different parts of 
                                                          
 228.  See infra Section II.C.4.  
 229.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 266; see also supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text 
(describing how a Washington, D.C. police officer relied on license plate numbers to target a spe-
cific class of individuals).  
 230.  Rushin, supra note 151, at 43–44.  
 231.  YOU ARE BEING TRACKED, supra note 184, at 32; see also United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the potential privacy threats that ex-
ist when law enforcement relies on GPS tracking devices to monitor citizens).   
 232.  Jennifer Lynch & Peter Bibring, Los Angeles Cops Should Release Automatic License 
Plate Reader Records, EFF & ACLU Argue in Opening Brief, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/los-angeles-cops-should-release-
automatic-license-plate-reader-records-eff-aclu; see also Brief for Electronic Frontier Found. & 
Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU Law School, as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 20–24, 
Neal v. Fairfax Cty. Police Dep’t, 812 S.E.2d 444 (Va. 2018) (noting that the Virginia State Police 
used ALPR devices to scan the plates of all individuals that attended political rallies for Sarah Pal-
in and Barack Obama and that Immigration and Customs Enforcement has used ALPR devices to 
gather information about gun show customers).  
 233.  Brief for Electronic Frontier Found. & Brennan Ctr. for Justice, supra note 232, at 23 
(quoting Bobby Jindal, then-Governor of Louisiana).  
 234.  Id. at 22.  
 235.  Id. at 20.  
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the city to use ALPR devices to gather the license plates of individuals who 
go to mosques.236  Additionally, Electronic Frontier Foundation found that 
license plate data obtained from the Oakland Police Department demon-
strated that police officers were able to create a grid of the “city’s poorest 
neighborhoods” using collected license plate data. 237  The Oakland data 
highlighted racial disparity; as vehicles parked or drove through neighbor-
hoods that were predominately white, the vehicles “[were] less likely to be 
picked up by the ALPR cameras.”238  In contrast, vehicles driving or pass-
ing through neighborhoods with a higher black or Hispanic population were 
more likely to have their plate read by an ALPR device.239  For this reason, 
legislation should also include provisions that prevent law enforcement 
from targeting individuals based on their membership in a protected 
class.240  Effective legislation could counter the negative and chilling effect 
that exists when individuals are aware that their license plates are being 
tracked.241  This type of compromise would still allow the government to 
benefit from the use of ALPR devices to track criminals and prevent crime 
but also would ensure that citizen privacy is not negatively impacted by the 
indiscriminate collection of license plate data.242 
2.  Reasonable Suspicion and Reducing Error 
Allowing law enforcement to have discretion in choosing when to 
make a stop or how to carry out their duties is a crucial aspect of policing, 
but there should still be guidelines in place to ensure that an officer is stop-
ping the correct vehicle for the correct crime to minimize the risk of er-
ror.243  In Green v. City of San Francisco,244 the plaintiff was stopped be-
cause her vehicle was thought to be associated with reports of a stolen 
vehicle.245  As the plaintiff complied with the officers’ orders, at least four 
                                                          
 236.  YOU ARE BEING TRACKED, supra note 184, at 11; see also Adam Goldman & Matt 
Apuzzo, With Cameras, Informants, NYPD Eyed Mosques, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 23, 2012), 
https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2012/with-cameras-informants-nypd-eyed-mosques (explain-
ing that “[t]he NYPD Intelligence Division snapped pictures and collected license plate numbers 
of congregants . . . [and] [p]olice mounted cameras on light poles and aimed them at mosques”).  
 237.  Dave Maass & Jeremy Gillula, What You Can Learn from Oakland’s Raw ALPR Data, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-
learned-oakland-raw-alpr-data.  
 238.  Id.  
 239.  Id.  
 240.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 245–46. 
 241.  Id.  
 242.  Fisher, supra note 150, at 349.  
 243.  GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 15 (noting “misreads occur [and] the systems’ readers 
can have difficulty distinguishing between plates from different states”).  
 244.  See supra notes 95–103 and accompanying text.  
 245.  Green v. City of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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officers were pointing their weapon towards her.246  After the plaintiff was 
subjected to a pat-down search that revealed nothing, the officers “finally” 
ran the plaintiff’s license plate number—finding that her license plate 
matched her vehicle, which had not been reported stolen.247  Even though 
the plaintiff had only been subjected to a pat-down, the experience was 
nonetheless terrifying and resulted in her attending counseling and missing 
several weeks of work.248  Instances such as this one highlight the im-
portance of ensuring there is some sort of guidance in place to help mitigate 
the risk of error.249  
Establishing guidelines on when an officer can make a stop based on 
an ALPR alert is one way to ensure that citizens are not wrongfully stopped 
for crimes they have not committed.250  Confirming license plate numbers 
match an active alert for criminal activity is important because hotlists may 
not always be up-to-date, which may mean a stolen vehicle may have been 
recovered and the driver of the vehicle is the actual licensed driver.251  Ad-
ditionally, there exists the potential for error in the form of misreads by the 
ALPR device, which only heightens the need for law enforcement to dou-
ble-check and confirm plate reads before making a stop.252 
In Green, the plaintiff was eventually allowed to leave and law en-
forcement was deemed to be merely carrying out their duties, but the case 
highlights a very real issue—ALPR devices provide benefits, but relying 
too much on quick computer reads can result in traumatic experiences for 
individuals.253  Several factors can influence a plate read, such as “vehicle 
speed,” “weather conditions,” lighting conditions,” or even the “character 
                                                          
 246.  Id.  
 247.  Id.   
 248.  Martha Neil, City Faces Suit over Police Stop Based on License-Plate Reader Error, 
A.B.A. J. (June 18, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/license-plate_reader/.  
 249.  Jennifer Lynch, New Ninth Circuit Opinion Calls into Question Blind Reliance on Li-
cense Plate Camera IDs, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 21, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/new-ninth-circuit-opinion-calls-question-blind-reliance-
license-plate-camera-ids (noting that the International Association of Chiefs of Police has de-
scribed visual confirmation “as one of the ‘essential components’ of training on ALPR use”).  
 250.  GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 59 (finding “[m]ost agencies require alert verification 
via mobile terminals or confirming calls to dispatch before officers act”).  
 251.  Id. at 15.  
 252.  Id.; see Cyrus Farivar, Due to License Plate Reader Error, Cop Approaches Innocent 
Man, Weapon in Hand, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 23, 2014, 3:40 PM),  https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/04/due-to-license-plate-reader-error-cop-approaches-innocent-man-weapon-in-hand/ 
(finding that the driver of a BMW was stopped after the ALPR device “misread a ‘7’ on [the driv-
er’s] license plate for a ‘2’ . . . “alert[ing] the officers to a stolen Oldsmobile and not a BMW”); 
GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 15, 59 (finding “the systems’ readers can have difficulty distin-
guishing between plates from different states” meaning ALPR “cameras might match a plate pho-
to to a hotlist alert—but the plate may belong to a vehicle from the wrong state”); see also supra 
note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the risk of error associated with ALPR devices).  
 253.  See supra notes 245–248 and accompanying text.  
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and/or plate color.”254  Stops such as the one in Green are felony stops—
meaning officers face greater risks and are more likely to display their 
weapons.255  In one instance where an individual was mistakenly stopped 
for being in possession of a stolen vehicle, the individual explained that the 
officer’s gun was not pointed at him, “but it was definitely out of the hol-
ster.”256  The discretion officers have in deploying a weapon depends on the 
severity of the crime.257  Therefore, it becomes increasingly important that 
ALPR devices are not misreading plates, especially as mistrust between law 
enforcement and minority communities continues to increase.258 
States that have implemented similar provisions in their state laws can 
provide a guide to the federal statute as to what type of guidelines should be 
included to ensure accountability and that citizens are protected from mis-
reads or inaccurate data.259  New Hampshire and Montana’s reasonable sus-
picion guideline should serve as the guide for implementing a system that 
strives to protect citizens from being pulled over based on inaccurate da-
ta.260  Further, establishing these requirements in legislation clarifies the re-
sponsibilities of law enforcement officials, thus avoiding the problem in 
Green where the reasonable suspicion policies were unclear.261 
                                                          
 254.  ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
 255.  Farivar, supra note 252. 
 256.  Id.   
 257.  Id.  
 258.  See Race, Trust and Police Legitimacy, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., (July 14, 2016), 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/legitimacy/Pages/welcome.aspx (noting that “minori-
ties are more likely than whites to view law enforcement with suspicion and distrust”); Hannah 
Fingerhut, Deep Racial, Partisan Divisions in Americans’ Views of Police Officers, PEW RES. 
CTR., (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/15/deep-racial-partisan-
divisions-in-americans-views-of-police-officers/ (finding that in a 2017 survey “whites give law 
enforcement warm ratings (74%),” whereas only 30% of black Americans gave a warm rating and 
30% gave a “very cold rating”); Russell Heimlich, Limited Black Confidence in Police, PEW RES. 
CTR. (July 30, 2009), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2009/07/30/limited-black-confidence-
in-police/ (explaining that a 2007 survey found “about half (55%) of all African Americans ex-
press confidence in the police to do a good job enforcing the law, [and] just 38% are confident 
police will refrain from using excessive force on crime suspects and just 37% are confident that 
the police will treat all races equally”); see also notes 237–241 (explaining that in Oakland, the 
police department is more likely to deploy ALPR devices in black and Hispanic communities).  
 259.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-3204 (2018) (requiring ALPR device systems be updated “at the 
beginning of each law enforcement shift if such updates are available”); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§20-184(e)(noting law enforcement agencies shall update ALPR systems “every 24 hours if such 
updates are available or as soon as practicable after such updates become available”).  
 260.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b(VIII) (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-118(1) 
(2017).  
 261.  See infra notes 272–275.   
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3.  Lower Cost Data Storage Increases Citizen Privacy 
Infringement 
As the cost of data storage has drastically decreased, law enforcement 
agencies are now able to store a greater quantity of data for a substantially 
cheaper price.262  However, tension exists between the desire to preserve 
data long-term in the hopes that it will prove useful in a later criminal in-
vestigation and the desire to protect citizen privacy rights.263  Collecting da-
ta has enormous benefits for law enforcement; one such benefit is that it 
aids in criminal investigations.264  The ACLU and other privacy advocates 
have criticized the law enforcement practice of mass aggregation of citizen 
data because private citizens are always leaving traces of themselves.265  
Analyzing that data allows police departments “to draw increasingly power-
ful inferences about [a] person’s motives, desires, and behaviors.”266  In 
drafting legislation, Congress should focus on the aggregation of data be-
cause this is what links individuals to other instances where their plate in-
formation has been read, and it can paint a more vivid picture of the indi-
vidual.267 
In determining the appropriate length of time to keep collected data, 
the duration should not be any longer than necessary to accomplish the 
goals of the ALPR program.268  One suggestion on a reasonable amount of 
time that data should be stored is three weeks.269  Three weeks is effective 
because it is unlikely that law enforcement will be able to record an indi-
vidual’s license plate number multiple times across a three-week period, 
given the mobile nature of the devices.270  Implementing limits on how long 
data can be stored is an appropriate way to allow law enforcement to con-
tinue carrying out their duties of protecting citizens while also ensuring the 
rights of citizens are not being violated.271  New Hampshire has one of the 
shortest retention policies requiring deletion within three minutes if there is 
no match to a crime database, but this limitation is not as effective for law 
enforcement.272  Such a short retention time restricts the capabilities of law 
                                                          
 262.  Rushin, supra note 151, at 20–21; Rushin, supra note 144, at 291–292.  
 263.  Newell, supra note 180, at 398.  
 264.  GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 13.  
 265.  Steven D. Seybold, Somebody’s Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection 
Technologies, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1035 (2015). 
 266.  Id.  
 267.  See Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 264; see also Seybold, supra note 265, at 1035 
(explaining that new developments in data storage allows more data to be stored and analyzed).  
 268.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 266–67. 
 269.  Fisher, supra note 150, at 349.  
 270.  Id.   
 271.  Id.  
 272.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b(VIII) (2017). 
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enforcement to use these devices to solve crime.273  Longer data retention 
policies, such as the three-year-period required in Colorado, opens up the 
potential for data to be mined—a concern of Justice Sotomayor in Jones.274  
As Justice Alito also noted in Jones, using GPS devices for long-term in-
vestigative monitoring “of most offenses impinges on expectations of pri-
vacy.”275  A three-week or so retention limit is already in effect in Maine 
and smaller police departments suggest this is not an unreasonable limit for 
data storage.276 Therefore, three weeks achieves a balance between law en-
forcement needs and citizen privacy protections.277 
However, a blanket prohibition of three weeks would be ineffective if 
law enforcement was relying on certain license plate numbers for an on-
going criminal investigation.278  ALPR devices have played a crucial role in 
identifying individuals associated with a crime.279  There should be excep-
tions in the legislation that allow law enforcement to keep the data for a 
longer period of time to learn more “about ongoing cases or to identify 
crime trends and patterns.”280  Several states have included in their statutes 
                                                          
 273.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 228. 
 274.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-113(2)(a) (2015); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 
415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 
1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)); YOU ARE BEING TRACKED, supra note 184, at 8 
(highlighting that ALPR devices and the collected data “can be used for tracking people’s move-
ments for months or years on end”). 
 275.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).  
 276.  ME. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A(5) (2009) (providing that data should be retained for twen-
ty-one days); ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 4, at 29 fig.14 (finding that Arlington, VA and 
Takoma Park, MD police departments limit data retention to 30 days); id at tbl.18 (noting that 
seven surveyed police departments had a data retention policy of less than 30 days whereas only 
five allow indefinite storage of data).  
 277.  ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 4, at 23 (finding one law enforcement community 
was able to able to use captured plate data to find vehicle scans of a missing elderly person allow-
ing law enforcement to zone in on one narrow region to quickly locate a missing person who 
needed medical attention); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring) (“[T]he government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal[s] private aspects 
of identity is susceptible to abuse.”).  
 278.  Fisher, supra note 150, at 349. 
 279.  See Karen Farkas, License-Plate Scanners Result in Few ‘Hits,’ but Are Invaluable in 
Solving Crimes, Police Say, CLEVELAND.COM, https://www.cleveland.com/cuyahoga-
coun-
ty/2017/12/license_plate_readers_result_in_few_hits_but_are_invaluable_in_solving_crimes_poli
ce_say.html (last updated Dec. 5, 2017) (noting that ALPR devices aided in the arrest of a burgla-
ry suspect); Lisa J. Huriash, License Plate Readers Are Solving Crime, Cities Say, SOUTH FL. SUN 
SENTINEL (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-coral-springs-license-
plates-20160122-story.html (explaining that Miami-Dade police officers relied on a license plate 
reader alert to pull over a red Camaro that had been reported stolen and led officers to also discov-
er a stolen gun in the vehicle). 
 280.  GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 4, at 72; see also notes 67–68 and accompanying text (de-
scribing ways that the legislature could develop suggestions on how long law enforcement should 
keep license plate data).  
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methods of preserving data that is pertinent to a crime.281  For example, Ne-
braska allows “captured plate data” to be stored longer if it is needed for “a 
warrant, subpoena, or court order.”282  These types of exceptions ensure that 
citizen data is not being stored and “mined for future intrusions into their 
daily behaviors,” while also allowing law enforcement to carry out its du-
ties effectively.283 
4.  Ensuring Benefits Continue to Outweigh the Harms Through 
Public Oversight and Auditing Systems 
To ensure that ALPR devices are not being abused, it is necessary to 
include provisions that relate to public oversight and auditing systems.284  
However, it is also important to take steps to ensure that the policies are be-
ing followed.285  To illustrate, the Boston Police Department accidentally 
released a substantial amount of unredacted license plate data.286  This re-
lease demonstrated that the Boston Police Department was reckless in both 
their failure to follow their own guidelines and in their release of the da-
ta.287 
In the case of the Boston Police Department, the fundamental problem 
was a lack of sufficient oversight.288  The officers held on to the data for 
over six months, even though they were required to delete it after three 
months. 289  Additionally, the program was never audited to determine how 
well it was working or if the agency was following its own guidelines.290  
                                                          
 281.  CAL. VEH. CODE §2413(b) (West 2011) (allowing data to be stored longer than 60 days if 
“the data is being used as evidence or for all felonies being investigated”); MINN. STAT. 
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 284.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 269–70.  
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 286.  Id. 
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 96 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [VOL. 78:63 
The Boston Police Department fiasco highlights the importance of oversight 
and the need for effective guidelines to ensure ALPR devices are used 
properly.291  Ensuring that there is some system in place, whether it is in the 
form of audit requirements or oversight, can mitigate privacy concerns and 
hold law enforcement agencies accountable for their actions in relation to 
how ALPR devices are used.292 
Civilian oversight would be an effective oversight method, rather than 
mere reliance on an internal police review board.293  Civilian oversight 
promotes independence and transparency and can lead to systematic correc-
tion.294  Additionally, this type of oversight, especially in the area of police 
departments, has been viewed as promoting “democratic principles” be-
cause it provides the public with a larger role in having control over their 
police departments.295  Civilian oversight can be especially useful as law 
enforcement departments begin to implement ALPR technology and devel-
op policies because it allows citizens to have a voice in the development of 
the police department practices, while also enabling the local community to 
have a method of connecting with the police department to discuss any in-
consistences or flaws with the system.296  However, of the country’s top fif-
ty police departments, only nineteen allow civilian review boards “to re-
view and make recommendations related to departmental policies and 
practices.”297  The limited ability for civilian review boards to make rec-
ommendations regarding police department policies or practices has led to 
civilian-oversight boards being criticized as inefficient and ineffective.298  
Using civilian review boards to oversee data collection and retention poli-
cies of ALPR systems will require reconsideration of the powers granted to 
civilian review boards to ensure their recommendations have an impact.299 
Police internal review boards pose more of a challenge for oversight 
because ALPR devices are implemented for public safety, so officers may 
be hesitant to follow oversight regulations that aim to protect citizen priva-
                                                          
 291.  Dryer & Stroud, supra note 19, at 270.  
 292.  INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 215, at 48. 
 293.  Seybold, supra note 265, at 1040, 1045. 
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REV. 837, 869 (explaining that civilian review boards have been criticized as “‘weak, ineffective, 
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 296.  Seybold, supra note 265, at 1046.  
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 298.  Id. at 1043–44.   
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 2019] AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 97 
cy at the expense of promoting public safety.300  Further, higher-ranking of-
ficers “may set a tone of disrespect and disregard for internal policies or 
may normalize improper behavior . . . as a ‘cost of doing business.’”301  
Additionally, internal review boards tend to be biased towards police offic-
ers and present difficulties for citizens who are filing complaints about mis-
conduct.302  Filing a complaint can sometimes require burdensome and un-
necessary requirements.303  This is especially troublesome with ALPR data 
collection because the public might not be aware of how their community is 
using ALPR devices, making it more challenging for citizens to file a com-
plaint.304 
Another way of ensuring that ALPR devices are being used effectively 
is to implement an audit system so the public can gain an understanding of 
whether ALPR devices are effective.305  Establishing reporting procedures 
and methods of oversight requires law enforcement agencies to make sure 
that all information obtained using ALPR devices is done in compliance 
with the statute.306  Including an audit provision ensures accountability and 
that the devices continue to provide a benefit to the community.307  ALPR 
devices should be monitored because they allow law enforcement to collect 
massive amounts of data at a level “we have never experienced.”308  
Police departments and other public entities using ALPR devices 
should also be required to submit statistical analyses or other reports that 
demonstrate the usefulness of ALPR devices.309  The reports should include 
data on “the number of license plates scanned, the names of the lists against 
which captured plate data were checked, the number of hot list matches, the 
number of hot list matches that were incorrect, and the number of matches 
that resulted in arrest and prosecution.”310  Additionally, audit logs should 
                                                          
 300.  Seybold, supra note 265, at 1041–42. 
 301.  Id. at 1041 (quoting Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Miscon-
duct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 474–75 (2004)).  
 302.  Id.; see also Moran, supra note 294, at 844 (noting that “[s]aying internal affairs units are 
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using ALPR systems to code statistical data into a format that can be accessible by the public for 
review).  
 308.  Hubbard, supra note 10, at 21. 
 309.  Fisher, supra note 150, at 349–50. 
 310.  Id. at 349; see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 2413(e) (West 2011) (mandating reports to the 
California legislature each year); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY  § 3-509(e)(1–6) (Supp. 2018) 
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be maintained and checked to identify inconsistences that could signal the 
potential of abuse.311  Audit logs can deter law enforcement from using the 
ALPR database inappropriately or for reasons unrelated to public safety if 
the officers are aware that their access to the data is being monitored.312 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Automated license plate readers provide law enforcement with the 
tools to drastically increase their efficiency.313  Current Fourth Amendment 
privacy jurisprudence cannot be effectively applied to ALPR devices in a 
way that balances law enforcement priorities with privacy interests.314  With 
this increase in technological efficiency, lawmakers and regulatory authori-
ties need to take steps to ensure that the public is not harmed with the in-
crease in ALPR technology.315  Congressional action can serve to clearly 
identify societal expectations of privacy, thus providing a guide to the 
courts as to how to analyze these ever-evolving technologies.316  These pro-
posed recommendations provide guidance on some of the most fundamental 
elements that should be included to ensure citizen privacy is protected but 
not at the expense of law enforcement.317  ALPR devices are useful tools, 
but given their potential to acquire substantial amounts of private infor-
mation regarding an individual’s daily activities, it is of the utmost im-
portance that Congress acts to protect citizen privacy.318   
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